Controlling the Corridors in Sudan: Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Response Rooms
June 2, 2025 | Written by Hatem Zayed, Cecilia Cavero-Sanchez, and Susanna Campbell
Introduction
In August of 2024, the world’s leading hunger monitor, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), reported a famine in Sudan – a status only declared three other times since the IPC’s inception 20 years ago (Michael 2024). Following the outbreak of fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, humanitarian conditions in Sudan quickly deteriorated, reaching an unprecedented low. Yet, despite the overwhelming need for humanitarian aid, international providers of aid, and specifically UN Agencies, have struggled to deliver aid without the approval of the internationally recognized Sudan’s army-backed government (SAF), effectively creating what some experts have called a “humanitarian desert” in parts of the country that are controlled by the RSF (Michael 2024). In this piece, we use network data on aid actors in Sudan to explore how connections to government actors influences partnership decisions of international aid actors, particularly as it relates to partnership with local aid actors that continued providing services in hard to reach areas, like volunteer-led mutual aid groups. We argue that organizations that had relatively weak ties with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have been more likely to collaborate with informal mutual aid groups to deliver aid in hard-to-reach areas.
The struggles of international humanitarian actors in Sudan are not new. The many shocks in Sudan over the years have severely disrupted the ability of aid actors to carry out humanitarian programs. Funding constraints and sanctions have created chronic instability, while government restrictions, enforced through the Humanitarian Affairs Committee (HAC), have imposed significant regulatory burdens. Between 2018 and 2020, Sudan experienced a short-lived heyday for civil society growth, marked by expanded freedoms and increased international engagement. However, the onset of COVID-19 curtailed this progress, and the 2021 military coup tightened government control, further restricting civic space and dissuading youth mobilization. By 2023, the outbreak of war forced most international organizations to evacuate from Khartoum and made it increasingly difficult to operate in RSF-controlled areas.
Within this broader context, informal aid actors, namely the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), emerged as actors who were able to operate in all governorates in Sudan, including areas controlled by the RSF. With the outbreak of the war, ERRs emerged from Sudanese Resistance Committees as grassroots youth-led organizations delivering aid in hard-to-reach areas, particularly in RSF-controlled zones. These groups primarily rely on members’ donations, the communities they serve, and diaspora contributions for funding – and thus have been referred to as a “mutual aid” group. Since then, they have been hailed by many enthusiastic experts and scholars as providing a viable alternative to the otherwise constrained traditional aid actors. Given that ERRs were the most likely actors to be able to provide aid to vulnerable populations in Sudan, the broader question emerges of when and how international aid actors were able to work with ERRs. We find that only organizations with weak ties to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) or a strong track record of working with local actors were more likely to have successfully collaborated with informal mutual aid groups to deliver aid in hard-to-reach areas.
Our findings, which appear in a forthcoming paper, are based on a multi-method design, combining qualitative data collected via interviews and focus group discussions conducted with 53 participants, including aid actors in Sudan as well as experts, with quantitative data collated in a network dataset on aid organizations operating in Sudan since 2005. We use data from the UN Multi-Partner Trust Funds (MPTF) in Sudan to examine the evolution of the aid network in Sudan, particularly between 2006 and 2020. This research was funded by the United States Institute of Peace award, “Whose Peace? How Local-Global Networks Shape Multilateral Peacebuilding Outcomes,” which explores relationships between local and global actors in conflict-affected countries.
From 2009 to 2012, the MPTF network of aid expanded significantly, with the Sudanese government, in yellow, emerging as a key player. Inter-governmental organizations – in dark green – began funding government agencies directly, while other non-governmental actors gained prominence. By 2012, the UN Development Programme became the central actor, channeling aid to international NGOs and national NGOs, as well as other civil society organizations and bilateral donors – in purple, blue, and red respectively, shown in the left cluster of the 2012 network.
Figure 1. 2012 network
The 2012 visualization of the network in Figure 1[2] reveals different degrees of government involvement, with some clusters showing a high concentration of government actors and others minimal government presence – see the cluster on the bottom right of the figure, where government actors collaborate with intergovernmental organizations and funds. The cluster involving other types of actors, e.g. civil society, has a much lower degree of government involvement.
Depicting the Fragmentation of Aid Networks, 2013-2020
Between 2013 and 2017, NGOs and CSOs gradually disappeared from the network, leaving primarily government actors and IGOs. After the US-imposed sanctions began lifting in 2017, 2018 marked a pivotal expansion in the aid network, with a significant diversification of funding sources and recipients.
Figure 2. 2015 network
As shown in Figure 3, the network developed more intricate aid delivery chains, involving a broader range of actors. Government involvement (yellow nodes) remained strong. However, compared to previous years, there is an observed increase in the role of INGOs, NNGOs – while IGOs remained central throughout and government roles became less central in comparison. This coincides with the lifting of sanctions.
Figure 3. 2018 network
We use community detection methods[3] to identify clusters of organizations in the 2018 network. Community detection in network analysis is the process of finding groups, or “communities,” of organizations that are more densely connected to each other than to the rest of the network. This helps reveal patterns of organizations that tend to form contracts or partnerships with one another more frequently than with those outside their group.
Figure 4. Distribution of organization types across communities in 2018
Figure 4 offers a snapshot of how different types of organizations grouped together in Sudan’s 2018 aid network. Out of seven distinct communities, government actors are present in just two, where they cluster tightly with intergovernmental organizations, funds, and both international and national NGOs. The remaining communities are made up almost entirely of national and international NGOs, operating without direct government involvement. This pattern highlights a key feature of Sudan’s aid landscape at the time: while government agencies and their close partners formed their own interconnected hubs, NGOs tended to cluster together in separate communities. These clusters reflect not only patterns of collaboration and partnership, but also the ways in which government policies and relationships shaped who worked together.
Starting in 2020 (Figure 5), the network of aid actors started to shrink. Though our network data are limited to 2006-2020, our qualitative analysis shows that after the 2021 coup there was reduced cooperation across aid actors. The patterns revealed by our network analysis are not merely descriptive; they have direct implications for humanitarian outcomes on the ground. As the network became increasingly fragmented and government-centric, traditional international actors found themselves constrained. This fragmentation created critical gaps in aid delivery gaps that grassroots organizations like the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) were uniquely positioned to fill. The following section explores how these network dynamics shaped the ability of different actors to respond during the most recent conflict, highlighting the pivotal role of informal, locally rooted groups in reaching the most vulnerable populations.
Figure 5. 2020 network
The Evolution of Aid Networks During Conflict, 2023-2025
We use our qualitative data to understand how these aid networks evolved during the most recent outbreak of war in Sudan in 2023. The rapid outbreak of civil war in Khartoum contributed to increased fragmentation of the aid networks described in the network analysis presented above, leaving grassroots organizations like ERRs to fill critical gaps in conflict-affected areas. Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) have since become indispensable in regions of Sudan where other actors face significant challenges in delivering aid, particularly in RSF-controlled areas. Their appeal lies in their adaptability, strong grassroots connections, and insider relationships with warring factions. ERRs have leveraged their community ties to build trust, access local resources, and navigate the complexities of operating in conflict zones. Additionally, ERRs have shown remarkable flexibility by using local schools as safe zones for aid distribution, fostering tolerance between host communities and displaced persons, and addressing sensitive issues with which traditional NGOs struggle. This combination of grassroots support and operational adaptability has made ERRs an appealing partner in hard-to-reach areas.
Our findings show that government relations significantly influenced partnerships with ERRs, often deterring inter-governmental organizations from working with ERRs. Many ERRs remained unregistered with the Humanitarian Affairs Committee (HAC) to avoid bureaucratic restrictions, but this informal status complicated collaboration with international actors reliant on formal partnerships. In SAF-controlled areas, some ERRs have registered with HAC for legal protection, but this has exposed them to heightened scrutiny and co-optation risks. Furthermore, concerns over the politicization of ERRs, given their roots in Sudanese Resistance Committees, have deterred some international organizations from forming partnerships. This hesitancy has left many ERRs navigating both suspicion from local authorities and a lack of direct support from global aid networks. Instead, some large INGOs have chosen to rely on direct implementation, making it virtually impossible to work in RSF-controlled areas.
Those who were able to partner with ERRs were less tied to strong partnerships with SAF and were described by respondents as having a greater "risk appetite" and a stronger "political will" to work with informal actors that could potentially harm their relationship with SAF. Such organizations were more likely to adapt their systems to accommodate ERRs, using innovative approaches such as intermediary partners, in-kind support, or small cash transfers that were otherwise intended for entrepreneurship projects. The ability to bypass rigid partnership requirements and leverage existing local networks has proven essential for sustaining aid delivery in regions where ERRs are often the only operational actors.
Potential Policy Implications
Like other conflict-affected contexts around the world, humanitarian corridors in Sudan are controlled by the warring parties, limiting the options for humanitarian aid delivery. While many actors have struggled to deliver aid in hard-to-reach areas, others have sought untraditional solutions, such as partnering with informal mutual aid groups like the Emergency Response Rooms (ERR). Consequently, promoting flexible funding mechanisms tailored for grassroots organizations such as ERRs has been critical. Small grants, in-kind contributions, and cash transfer programs provided much-needed support while minimizing bureaucratic barriers. For example, some INGOs have used intermediary NGOs to channel resources to ERRs, while others have provided direct logistical and material assistance and small cash transfers.
Some humanitarian agencies in Sudan have demonstrated risk-tolerant strategies to engage with unregistered local actors. These strategies include simplified vetting processes and adaptive partnership models that enabled more inclusive collaboration, particularly in conflict zones. Much of the localization research has emphasized investment in capacity building programs for grassroots actors by implementing programs that focus on training in financial management, monitoring and evaluation. However, such efforts continue to be unrealistic for conflict-affected settings due to urgency of intervention and undermine local actors by highlighting their 'reduced capacity' rather than addressing the rigidity of international actors. Instead, actors who sought partnership with ERRs in Sudan were able to move past the 'reduced capacity' deterrent through low-risk, small cash-based financial transfers.
An aid actor's position within a network, and particularly their proximity and relationship with warring parties or governments, affects their humanitarian delivery tactics as well as their choice of partnerships. Donors and international organizations should leverage existing in-country networks to identify key partnership opportunities, particularly during periods of political openness. Such insights can guide efforts to build resilient aid delivery efforts that balance immediate humanitarian needs with long-term development goals. Importantly, partnership behavior, and specifically choices around whether to partner with local aid actors, could be observed from networking decisions made by organizations long before the 2023 war, and were corroborated by data collected since the outbreak of fighting.
Finally, understanding the nature of restrictive government policies enforced by SAF and other authorities in conflict-affected countries, should guide aid and make it more responsive to the needs and experiences of local actors rather than discourage donors from funding what they believe is a “risky” investment. Academic scholarship and practitioners have discussed how donors retreat in times of increased restriction, whereas the opposite should occur to support local civil society organizations and humanitarian actors in navigating the many challenges that come with operating in a restrictive civic environment.
Our research underscores the need to strengthen partnerships among international actors and grassroots organizations such as ERRs. Our network and qualitative data highlights that actors behave differently depending on their network position and proximity to other actors that may restrict their decision-making. Leveraging these data and network analysis more broadly can guide more effective and inclusive partnership decisions.
[1] We originally prepared this policy brief for presentation at Interaction in Washington, DC in January 2025. Given the concurrent events in the aid community in DC, this presentation was cancelled.
[2]Node (organization) sizes reflect the number of contracts each organization is involved in.
[3] We use the Walktrap algorithm because it best captures the modularity of the 2018 network.
References
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Hatem Zayed completed his PhD in International Relations from the School of International Service (SIS) at American University in July 2023. His dissertation research explored how Egyptian Nonprofit Organizations adapt to shrinking civic space, and specifically how their funding model impacts the ways in which they navigate restrictive government policies. While at SIS, Hatem has worked as a research fellow at the Research on International Policy Implementation Lab (RIPIL) as well as a fellow at the Accountability Research Center (ARC) in addition to other teaching and research assistantship roles. Before starting his PhD, Hatem worked in several national and international NGOs in the human rights and development space in Egypt. He has since been an independent consultant on areas that relate to civic engagement, social accountability, education reform, and monitoring and evaluation. He currently supports teams in the World Bank's Social Development Global Practice on areas that relate to youth inclusion, civil society engagement, and anti-racism practices.
Cecilia Cavero-Sanchez is a Dual Title Ph.D. student in International Relations and Social Data Analytics at the Department of Political Science at Penn State. She is also a Research Fellow at the RIPIL Lab. She graduated with a double B.A. in International Studies and Political Science at Carlos III University of Madrid, where she received the Madrid Excellence award twice. The College of Political Scientists of Madrid awarded her with the Best International Relations Undergraduate Thesis prize. She also holds a Master of Research in International Relations from the University of Essex and a Master of Arts from Penn State. Before her graduate studies, she was a writer for the Berkeley Review of International Conflict and Security, interned for the Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and interned as an Intelligence Analyst at the Cyber Counter-Threat Intelligence team at Deloitte. She has also worked as a research assistant for multiple qualitative and quantitative research projects. Her academic interests center around peacebuilding, dispute management, and post-conflict reconstruction.
Susanna Campbell is a Provost Associate Professor in the Department of Foreign Policy and Global Security, School of International Service (SIS) and the Director of the Research on International Policy Implementation Lab (RIPIL) at American University. Her research examines research-to-policy translation as well as interactions between international and domestic actors in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, addressing debates in the statebuilding, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, international aid, global governance, and foreign policy literatures. She uses mixed-method research designs and have conducted extensive fieldwork in conflict-affected countries, including Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Nepal, South Sudan, and Sudan. Susanna’s research has been supported by awards from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Humanity United, the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Swiss Network for International Studies, the United States Institute of Peace, the US National Science Foundation, the Swedish and Dutch governments, and the United Nations.
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